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Introduction
The role that patenting plays in the firm value equation has long been a question of considerable interest in the literature (Schmookler, 1962; Comanor and Scherer, 1969; Pakes, 1985; Jaffe, 1986; Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Griliches, 1990; Shan, et al., 1994; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Hall, et al., 2003) . This role is particularly relevant in the pharmaceutical industry given the high likelihood that firms will patent inventions (Cohen et al., 2003) .
However, it remains a theoretical and empirical question: How adequately do patent counts, or various other patent-derived measures, proxy for the innovative success of the firm? In this paper we explore this question with fresh data, using for the first time we are aware the combination of actual new product introductions by pharmaceutical firms, their associated product sales data, and these firms' patents, both those explicitly linked to the new products, and all other pharmaceutical research patents issued to these firms.
We make multiple contributions to the literature. First, we demonstrate that the relationship between patenting (and citation-weighted patenting) and new Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved product introductions has diminished considerably since results offered in the seminal work by Comanor and Scherer (1969) and later efforts by Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) . We also demonstrate that the relationship between research and development (R&D) expenditures and new FDA approved product introductions is considerably smaller than previously reported. Based upon superior data, our results provide evidence that calls into question the efficacy of using patents, citationweighted patents and R&D expenditures as proxies for new product development.
Second, we demonstrate that while measures of patenting and citation-weighted patenting remain important in predicting the arrival and the number of product introductions, the most important predictor is the loss of exclusivity protection on a current product. Our evidence suggests that pharmaceutical firms are acting strategically, targeting the three-year window around the loss of exclusivity to introduce new products.
The apparent ability of pharmaceutical firms, in general, to smooth firm revenues by targeting introductions appears to us impressive given the long development periods they face.
Third, some researchers have moved away from raw patent counts and instead focus on citation-weighted counts in order to determine "strength" or "importance" of a patent, or as a proxy for "value" (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hall, et al., 2003) .
Using a large sample of pharmaceutical-related patents for our firms, we are able to demonstrate that more highly-cited patents are more likely to be associated with an FDAapproved product. This finding is economically meaningful since these patents protect the revenue streams of approved products. In 2001, for example, average FDA approved products had revenues of $243 million.
Fourth, we explore the implications of relying upon the original filing date of United States patents, instead of relying upon the artificial "application date" listed on the front page of the patent document. Consistent with Graham (2004) , we use the first in what may be a string of patent application continuations, as an indicator of the date on which the granted patent originally entered the patent system. This correction is particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry, since a large share of granted patents in this sector have had at least one continuation in their application lineage. In our analysis, we find significant differences in the amount of pre-grant application lag that this correction offers. Moreover, we find that continuation counts are a positive and significant predictor of new product introductions, suggesting to us that this variable contains information about the strategic use of the patenting process by firms.
Fifth, unlike the extant empirical literature, we explicitly control for each pharmaceutical firm's underlying research portfolio. Across all specifications tested we find a positive and significant impact on new product introductions. This finding confirms prior research that shows the importance for firms to maintain healthy research pipelines (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006) .
Finally, we find no relationship between firm size and new product introductions.
Other work that uses patenting as a proxy for new product development has found a relationship between these two variables, either positive or negative (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Shan et al., 1994; Acs and Audretsch, 1989; and, Bound et al, 1984) . In contrast, our findings are consistent with prior work that uses actual new product introductions as a dependent variable and introduces firm size as an independent variable, and finds a size effect not significantly different from zero (Jensen, 1987) .
The remainder of the paper follows this structure: Section 2 briefly discusses patenting, new product development and research productivity trends in the pharmaceutical industry; Section 3 discusses the data used in our analysis; Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical finding; and Section 5 summarizes the analysis and discusses the implications of our results.
2.0
Patenting, new product development, and research productivity trends in the pharmaceutical industry
Research productivity trends
Our analysis demonstrates that research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry (as measured by the overall industry drug-exclusivity and patent horizon) declined in the late 1990s-precisely when pharmaceutical patenting was exploding (Hall, et al., 2001) . A substantial factor contributing to these declines was that currentmarket drugs were losing exclusivity protection at a much higher rate than they were being replaced by new FDA-approved products with exclusivity protection. 1 The term "exclusivity" refers to exclusive regulatory marketing rights granted by the FDA under 21 C.F.R. 314.108, which prevent generic products from entering the market.
The pharmaceutical industry had a combined total of approximately 1,100 years of aggregate exclusivity protection in 1998. By 2001, the exclusivity horizon had fallen to just over eight hundred years and showed a rapid rate of decline. Figure 1 plots the total aggregate count of exclusive years for unique products approved by the FDA in the focal year. The aging of the overall industry product profile is a critical factor explaining the observed rapid decline.
1 One explanation put forth by industry representatives for this decline is that the easy drugs have already been developed and that the drugs currently under development are much more sophisticated and target more difficult diseases. A second explanation, described in the Wall Street Journal (2004) , suggests that the heavy reliance on combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening did not produce the hits that were initially hoped for when this technology was adopted in the 1990s. Overall the number of candidates in some stage of testing has dramatically increased.
Nevertheless, the number of products actually approved by the FDA has remained relatively constant. This discrepancy suggests that a comparatively large number of drug candidates fail or are withdrawn during the testing process. For example, the ratio of candidates that mature to an NDA filing compared to the number of candidates in Phase III testing declined from 29 percent to 17 percent through the 1990s. 
Patenting and new product development
Explorations of the relationship between patenting and new product introduction in the context of pharmaceutical innovation has a long lineage in the literature. Comanor and Scherer (1969) Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Aspden, 1983; Bresman et al, 1999; Cantwell and Hodson, 1991; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Griliches, 1998; Napolitano and Sirilli, 1990; Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Pavitt, 1988; Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart, 2000) . The paper's implications are reasonably straightforward, although the authors did voice one important caveat that is too often given short shrift by subsequent authors who use patents as proxies for "research output."
Discussing their results, Comanor and Scherer (1969) state:
[o]ur empirical findings also suggest that patents may be a better index of research input than output. [] The number of patents applied for may represent the effort expended by the firm in inventing, rather than the magnitude of the inventions which result from this effort. While this finding is highly tentative, it is supported by the likelihood that the significance of a patent in terms of input is less variable than its significance in terms of output (p. 398).
As such, these authors admonish researchers to take care in interpreting their correlations too broadly.
Subsequent studies of the patent-performance relationship have attempted to reduce the variability found by Comanor and Scherer (1969) , principally by using different, or adding additional, measures. Cockburn and Griliches (1988) , for instance, examined whether changes in market value (Tobin's Q) are related to a firms' development of knowledge capital over time (measured as depreciated stocks of R&D expenditures and patent grants), and whether information on the importance of patents as an appropriability mechanism (Levin, et al., 1987) adds meaningful information and improves predictive power. While they find that patent measures on their own appear to capture some relevant aspects of intangible capital, they note that when R&D measures are included the patent estimate either disappears or is heavily attenuated. As such, the authors declare that there is "interesting information in patent counts, but it is subject to much error. Data on R&D expenditures, where available, are stronger measures of input to the process by which firms produce technical innovation than patents are of its 'output.'" (p. 422). Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2003) add patent citations, finding that the inclusion of this "importance" metric significantly improves a model in which patenting is related to firm value, finding that patenting alone is a less meaningful predictor.
Despite these findings, other studies continue to rely upon patent counts alone as a reasonably good predictor of firm research productivity. Henderson and Cockburn (1994) In sum, this body of work suggests to us that the academy's understanding of the relationship between patenting and firm performance is unsettled. Indeed early work by Comanor and Scherer (1969) and Cockburn and Griliches (1988) we believe are the best data available-actual new product introductions by pharmaceutical firms, their associated product sales data, and these firms' patents, both those explicitly linked to the new products, and all other pharmaceutical research patents issued to these firms. We find that, in the drugs industry, the patent-new product relationship does not hold. 
Data and sample

Research pipeline profiles
We believe that determining product-pipeline characteristics for our firms is a useful analytical innovation, and particularly meaningful given our research questions. In an effort to determine which products are in development at our sample firms, we use data from Pharmaprojects and NDA Pipeline during 1990 to 2001. These data contain information relating to the various stages of product development. For purposes of this study we focus on the following phases: Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III. In the FDAdrug approval process, Phase I involves safety testing, Phase II is concerned with smallscale human efficacy trials, and Phase III focuses on large-scale human efficacy trials (See Figure 2) . We also identify the broad therapeutic categories, through the Uniform Standard of Classification, in which each stream of research is focused.
3 Author's calculations based on sales data from IMS Health.
We consider two measures of a firm's research pipeline. Our primary measure, Pipeline count, is a count variable, in a given year, of the number of projects that a sample firm has in either Phase I, Phase II or Phase III clinical testing. The average firm in our sample has 28 products in some stage of clinical testing in any year.
As a robustness check to this measure we follow Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) and assign clinical probabilities to each of the phases of research. These assigned clinical probabilities reflect the likelihood that a potential treatment has of receiving FDA approval. We subsequently employ these values to construct a weighted value of each company's pipeline products, which we refer to as the Pipeline score.
The overall industry Pipeline count shows a marked increase in the mid-1990s
and reflects an underlying increase in the number of products in firms' research pipelines (See Figure 2) . The number of early-stage pipeline products dramatically increased in the late 1990s as did, to a lesser extent, the number of late-stage products. FDA approvals throughout this time period, however, remained fairly flat. Comparing this trend to those presented in Figure 1 , the increase in pipeline products appears to have not produced sufficient numbers of new unique products to stem the decline in the industry-wide firm exclusivity horizon.
Patent profiles
In this paper, we use patents issued in the U.S. by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The patents assigned to pharmaceutical firms may be characterized into two different types. First, firms are issued patents that are directly attached to an FDA-approved drug (as identified in the FDA Orange Book.) Second, firms are assigned a stock of non-attached patents. These stocks of non-attached patents contain patents that are related to pharmaceutical research and patents that are related to other types of activities (e.g., medical devices, consumer products, management software, etc.) In order to obtain a more meaningful picture of firm-level "pharmaceutical"
patenting, we employ a mechanism to select patents from among this stock, so as to isolate patents germane to our pharmaceutical R&D study.
Following an approach used in Graham and Mowery (2003) Thus, over 83 percent of patents actually attached to NDAs are assigned to these classes.
Moreover, there is substantial overlap when using USPTO (as opposed to IPC)
classifications. Using the 36 NBER patent database "technological subcategories"
derived from 418 USPTO classifications , we find that 75.6 percent of our 11,090 sample patents fall into two aggregated categories (numbered 14 and 31).
This share compares with the 93.7 percent of the 1,267 NDA-associated patents that fall into these same two categories. Since these two technology subcategories (built on USPTO patent classifications) are closely associated with approved FDA products, we can be reasonably confident that the underlying research related to patents in classes A61K and C07D is pharmaceutical related.
We make use of these international patent classifications to build a sample of pharmaceutical research patents assigned to commercially active pharmaceutical firms.
Employing our population of 1,951 products identified in the FDA Orange Book from 1982 to June 2006, we create a sample of all firms to which at least one FDA-approved product was assigned. These firms match to 325 unique USPTO organization codes, and we find that these organizations were issued a total of 154,775 patents during 1975 to 2001, and that 50,466 (32.6 percent) of these patents are assigned into the primary "pharmaceutical" classes A61K and C067. 5 Excluding the patents associated with FDAapproved products, we are left with 49,563 patents, 96.5 percent of which are assigned into the NBER technology subcategories 14 and 31 described above. For each major commercial drug firm in our sample, therefore, we produce a patent profile that includes both (1) all firm patents attached directly to FDA-approved products (n=903) and (2) the firm's underlying non-attached pharmaceutical-related patents (n=49,563).
We make one more correction to the patent data. It is common for researchers to use the "application date" disclosed on the front page of the U.S. patent document to represent the approximate date on which an invention was reduced to practice, or more conservatively entered into the formal patent system. As described in Graham (2006) , this assumption is mistaken because it fails to account for the string of "continuation" events in the application history of the patents. This assumption is particularly problematic when working with pharmaceutical patent data because the continuation rates in these patents may be as high as 60 percent of all issued patents (Graham, 2006) .
The continuation is a procedure available in the U.S. patent law that permits an applicant to re-start the application process, at will. There is no limit to the number of times that an application may be continued, 6 and the "application date" specified on the face of the patent document is merely the last of what may be a string of continued applications (Graham and Mowery, 2004 ).
In our sample of pharmaceutical research patents, we correct for continuing applications, testing the implications of using the "application date" versus the "original filing date". We define "original filing date" as the date associated with the first continuing application in the granted patent's application lineage. We find significant differences. By way of description, 46.2 percent of our sample of 50,466 5 We used a year 2001 truncation because elements of our product level sales data are available only to that year. Our 50,466 sample excludes A61K 07 "cosmetics" patents. 6 Although, since 1995, the applicant is limited to a total window of 20 years in which to both apply-for and enjoy protection upon a patent.
"pharmaceutical research" patents assigned to major commercial firms had at least one continuation in their patent application lineage. We also empirically test the lag between the original filing date and grant date for this sample. We find a mean lag between original application filing and patent grant of 35 months, while the median lag is 32 months. These measures compare with a mean of 24 months and a median of 22 months when one uses the "application date" on the face of the U.S. patent document. Finally, we explore the propensity to patent. Consistent with Hicks et al., (2001) we define "propensity to patent" as the ratio of patents to R&D expenditures (constant dollars, in millions). Our numerator in this measure equals the total number of (defined) pharmaceutical patents issued to our sample firms. Using a similarly-constructed compares this decline in "propensity to patent" against the ratio of real R&D expenditures to real sales. This latter ratio has remained reasonably constant at around 15 percent throughout the same time period. Accordingly, it appears that increases in R&D expenditures have kept pace with increases in sales. At the same time, however, overall patenting within our defined technology classes has also increased (see Figure 4 ). Taken together this suggests that the rate of R&D expenditures is increasing at a faster pace than is patenting, thereby depressing the overall "propensity to patent" measure in the later years depicted in Figure 3 . Our interpretation is consistent with the overall decline in research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry described by Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) .
Patent lags
While we find that the mean lag between patent filing and grant is 35 months for our sample of 50,466 patents, we note that this lag is not the key measure for our purposes. Because we seek to replicate Comanor and Scherer (1969) , we are interested in the relationship between patenting and new FDA-approved product introductions.
Consistent with that earlier study, we determine the lag between original filing and FDA approval for those patents associated with new products. is longer than the three-year lag originally reported and used by Comanor and Scherer (1969) in their analysis, and also longer than that used in several other studies (e.g., Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Ernst, 2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994) , we discuss below results derived from using both a three-and five-year lag for robustness.
Size of the firm
Studies that have considered firm-size in the context of patenting and firm performance have come to inconsistent conclusions about the role that firm size plays.
On one hand, Jensen (1987) employs actual new products as a dependent variable and reports that firm size has no effect when introduced as an independent variable. On the other hand, studies that have proxied for new products have shown firm effects to be significant (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Shan et al., 1994; Acs and Audretsch, 1989; and, Bound et al, 1984) .
We are able, like Comanor and Scherer (1969) and Jensen (1987) , to use superior data in that we use actual new product introductions, and not proxies, as our dependent variable. As a result, we introduce four different measures of firm size in order to ensure that we are adequately controlling for any possible size effects. The four variables we use are: the natural log of firm market capitalization (Log market cap), number of employees (Employees), natural log of firm total assets (Log total assets) and natural log of pharmaceutical sales (Log sales).
Empirical findings
Patenting as a proxy for new product development
Since Comanor and Scherer (1969) , researchers have been using patents as a proxy for new product development. The relationship between patents and new products has been backed by empirical analysis reported in Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) . Given the extreme importance that this hypothesized relationship plays as a foundation for the findings reported in subsequent research, we examine the methodology employed in each of these studies in greater detail. Comanor and Scherer (1969) (1969) is not appropriate.
We discuss these two works because they have important implications for the use of patenting as a proxy for new product development in the pharmaceutical industry. Our analysis produces dramatically different results. Simply stated, our results do not comport with the findings reported in the above works, thereby drawing into question the efficacy of using patents as a proxy for new product development -at least in the pharmaceutical sector.
In order to determine the origins of the differences, we duplicate the methodology employed by Comanor and Scherer (1969) with our data. Our empiricallyderived lag between patent application and new product introduction is five years. As a robustness check and in order to compare directly with Comanor and Scherer, we also report results for a three-year lag. We match products approved from the FDA Orange book from 1990 to 2001 and sales-weight these with sales data provided by IMS Health.
We are thus able to produce a measure that duplicates Comanor and Scherer's (1969) methodology. Next, we correlate this sales-weighted NCE measure with patent filings from 1985 to 1996 (five year lag). Summary statistics show a firm-year mean of 5.91 filings, with a maximum of 9.0 in 1994.
Our analysis produces a simple correlation of 0.1911. When we instead use a three-year lag (patent filings from 1987 to 1998) we find a simple correlation of 0.2350.
Holding firm size constant, we find partial correlations of 0.1785 and 0.2215, respectively. As stated above, these results are dramatically smaller than those reported in Comanor and Scherer (1969) .
Next, we duplicate to the extent possible the methodology employed by Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) . We mimic their approach and limit patent applications and product introductions to the same time periods they employ, and find a simple correlation of 0.2775 between patent applications and new product introductions. Over our larger sample time period, we find an overall simple correlation of 0.2314 between patent applications (three year lag) and new product introductions. When we consider a five-year lag on patent applications, we find a slightly lower simple correlation of 0.2263.
Regardless of the sample period or lag, our results are considerably lower than the 0.589 simple correlation reported by Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) .
As discussed above in Section 2.0, Comanor and Scherer (1969) conclude their paper by suggesting that "…patents may be a better index of research input than output." Results are reported in Table 3 (i). Correlations range from 0.0984 in 1986 to 0.3919 in 1991. All but three years are significant at the 1 percent level. 8 The overall sample correlation is significant at the 1 percent level. There appears to be no discernable pattern over this time period as regards changes or trends in the correlations. We do note, however, that the first year in our sample, 1985, follows the start of the so-called "strong patent period" reported by others and said to be ushered in by the creation of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a unitary patent appeals court (Kortum and Lerner, 1999) . The year 1985 also follows the structural break (1983-84) in U.S. and 1985 is, however, beyond the scope of our paper.
As a robustness check, we consider two additional simple correlations which are reported in Table 3 (ii) and One possible explanation for these results is that there has been a fundamental paradigm shift with respect to overall patenting activity within the pharmaceutical industry. Clearly, the amount of patenting in the industry has dramatically increased over time (see Figure 4 ). This increase in patenting over time, when coupled with the relatively stagnant number of new FDA-approved products, may be putting substantial downward pressure on these correlations. So, while we remain agnostic as to whether patenting may serve as an adequate measure of "invention activity," our findings suggest that patenting is not an appropriate proxy for innovation, or firm innovative performance, as defined by new FDA-approved products marketed by the pharmaceutical industry.
New FDA approved product introductions
Patent counts have become a increasingly-used indicator of innovative performance, especially in studies of new technologies, new processes and new products (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Aspden, 1983; Bresman et al, 1999; Cantwell and Hodson, 1991; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Griliches, 1998; Napolitano and Sirilli, 1990; Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Pavitt, 1988; Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart, 2000) . However, because our findings suggest that pharmaceutical patenting is no longer an adequate proxy for new products, we must ask: What purpose does it serve? We now move beyond simple correlations and begin to focus on more the nuanced relationship between patenting and new FDA-approved product introductions. Table 4 presents probit estimates for our data regressing New drug indicator on a series of independent variables expected to affect the probability that a firm introduces a new FDA approved product. 9 In following sections we explore whether certain variables are related to the number (count) of drugs introduced. The dependent variable used in the regressions reported in Table 4 is an indicator variable y it, that assumes a value of one for a given firm i in a specific year t if that firm introduces an FDA-approved product in a given year, and is zero otherwise. For independent variables we use five-year lagged Table 1 for variable definitions and Table 2 for descriptive statistics and variable correlations.
Across all four models (Model 1 to Model 4), we find a positive and significant impact of Lagged patent filings on the probability that a FDA-approved product is introduced in a given year. Marginal effects range from 0.27 percent to 0.37 percent and are all significant at the 1 percent level. With mean lagged filings of 5.50 and a standard deviation of 14.19, this suggests that for a one standard deviation change in Lagged patent filings there is between a 3.83 percent and 5.25 percent increase in the probability a new product is introduced.
The largest effects we report relate to the loss of exclusivity protection, represented as Drug loss and its various lags, both forward (Drug loss (t+1) and Drug 9 Results remain robust when a logit model is considered.
loss (t+2)) and backward (Drug loss (t-1)). We find a positive and significant impact of
Drug loss on the probability a product is introduced in a given year. In Model 3 and Model 4, we report the three other variants of Drug loss. We focus on whether there is a drug loss in the year prior to introduction (Drug loss (t-1) ), a drug loss in the year of introduction (Drug loss), a drug loss in the year following introduction (Drug loss (t+1)) and a drug loss in the two years following an introduction (Drug loss (t+2) ).
Provocatively, we find the largest effect associated with Drug loss, implying that firms are more likely to introduce new products in the same year that older products lose exclusivity protection. One obvious interpretation of this result is that firms are simply attempting to smooth earnings by ensuring that threatened revenues are replaced by new ones.
In Model 3, marginal effects for Drug loss (t-1), Drug loss, and Drug loss (t+1)
are 5 It should be no surprise that pharmaceutical firms attempt to manage product introductions so as to smooth revenues. What is more surprising that firms appear to be successful in managing that process, especially given the long lags involved in new product development. The loss of exclusivity on an existing drug is an important and economically meaningful event to the firm. As such, we take it that firms are aware of which revenue streams they have that are threatened, and have strong incentives to act strategically. In an effort to illustrate this point, we combine sales data from IMS Health Interested as we are in the role that these product introductions are playing, we add an empirical innovation and, in contrast to existing research, we explicitly control for the underlying research pipelines of the sample pharmaceutical firms. We consider two different measures: Pipeline count and Pipeline score. Both measures involve counts of the underlying number of research projects a firm has active in a given year. Pipeline score is a more complex measure in that it attaches probability weightings to the variousstage projects to generate an overall value in each time period (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006) . Even though it is more complex in its construction, unreported regressions show the effects remain similar to Pipeline count. Overall, we find positive and significant effects across all four models on the probability of new product introduction, with marginal effects ranging from 0.06 percent to 0.12 percent. With a mean value of 27.87
and a standard deviation of 41.56, this suggest that for a one standard deviation change in Pipeline count there is between a 2.49 percent and 4.98 percent increase in the probability a new product is introduced. Our pipeline findings are approximately the same in magnitude to those on Lagged patent filings.
In all four models, our variable Log R&D is positive and significant, with marginal effects ranging from 1.04 percent to 1.11 percent. For a one standard deviation increase in R&D expenditures we can expect approximately a 2.0 percent increase in the probability a new drug is introduced. The literature is replete with findings that relate R&D expenditures to patenting (e.g., Pakes, 1985; Jaffe, 1986; Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990; Ernst, 2001; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003) . However, there are fewer studies focusing on the relationship between R&D spending and new product development, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. An exception is Jensen (1987) in which a Poisson model was used to study the effects of R&D on new chemical entities (NCEs), producing a finding that increases in R&D expenditures increase the probability that a new drug is discovered.
Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) find a simple correlation of 0.817 between R&D and new products in the pharmaceutical industry (defined by SIC code). For our sample, the overall simple correlation between New drug indicator and Log R&D is 0.1046. If we limit our sample to the same time period considered by Hagedoorn and Cloodt, then the correlation falls to 0.0626. We have no explanation for this difference.
The interpretation between R&D and patent applications is much clearer than the relationship between R&D and new product introductions, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. The average development time for a new pharmaceutical product is ten to fifteen years from initial discovery to final FDA approval (DiMasi, 2001 ). The development process requires significant R&D expenditures throughout the entire time period. As a result, finding a positive and significant relationship between R&D expenditures and patenting may reflect some common unobserved factor in the firms' overall underlying research programs.
Finally, we directly measure firm size by Log market cap and Log total assets and indirectly by Employees and Log sales. Contrary to other work that has found some effect, either positive or negative, between firm size and innovative performance (e.g., Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Nohria and Gulati, 1996) , we find no effect between firm size, either direct or indirect, and new product introductions. Our finding is, however, consistent with Jensen (1987) . In Model 3 to Model 6 we report our findings for Drug loss and its various lags.
Patenting and new product introductions
In contrast to the results in Table 4 in which we find the coefficients peaking with Drug loss, these negative binomial specifications show that the coefficients are largest on Drug In contrast to the models employing probit estimations (Table 4) , we find no effect between Log R&D and the number of expected new product introductions. Across all specifications, both reported and unreported, the coefficients are not significant (tested to a 90 percent confidence interval). For robustness, we replicate Jensen's (1987) use of a
loss (t-1) and decline in magnitude to Drug loss (t+1). The variable is not significant by year (t+2). This result may be interpreted as suggesting that firms focus new
Poisson model, finding no significance on the coefficient for this variable. As a further robustness check we perform Levine and Renelt's (1992) implementation of Leamer's (1978 Leamer's ( , 1983 Leamer's ( , 1985 Leamer's ( , and 1988 ) extreme bound analysis (EBA) on Log R&D. We find that
Log R&D is not significant in any of the iterations. Interpreting the divergent results produced in the probit and negative binomial regressions, our findings may suggest that the size of R&D expenditures has an effect on the probability that a new drug is introduced by a firm in any year, but not on the number of expected drug introductions.
Finally, consistent with our findings in Section 4.2, we find no effect between our measures of firm size (Log market cap or Employees) and new product introductions. In unreported regressions, we produce similar results for Log total assets and Log sales. In addition to controlling for firm size, we again control for the underlying research pipelines of the sample pharmaceutical firms. Results are consistent with our previous findings. We find positive and significant (1 percent level) effects between a firm's research pipeline and new product introductions. Overall results in this specification are consistent with our probit analysis. In sum, these results bolster our findings that the largest marginal effects we demonstrate involve the loss of exclusivity protection on a current drug.
Patent citations and new product introductions
Some researchers have moved away from raw patent counts and instead focus on citation-weighted counts in order to determine the "strength" or "importance" of a patent, or as a proxy for its "value" (e.g., Aspden, 1983; Narin and Olivastro, 1988b; Trajtenberg, 1990; Stuart, 2000; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Fabrizio, 2004) . We address the issue of citation-weighted patents in two ways.
First, we explore whether citation-weighted patents are a more meaningful proxy for new products than are simple patent counts. Second, we address whether citation-weighted patents and the notion that they signal "strength" or "importance". 10 Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) report a correlation coefficient of 0.382 between patent citations and new products in the pharmaceutical industry. This figure compares to the 0.589 correlation they find between patenting and new products, suggesting that, contrary to other empirical findings Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) , they are consistent with the correlation coefficients we report in Table 3 between raw patenting and new products.
Our citation measure therefore, unlike Hagedoorn and Cloodt, shows a higher correlation coefficient than do simple patent counts, thereby lending support to the findings in and Hall et al. (2003) that patent citations contain more information than simple patent counts.
As a robustness check, we generate the trend in correlations over our entire time period. We present yearly correlation coefficients between Citation weighted filing and regressing New drugs on a series of independent variables that we expect to influence the number of expected new FDA-approved products are reported in Table 6 (a). Marginal effects are reported in Table 6 (b).
New drug indicator in column (ii) of
Consistent with our previous findings with respect to Lagged patent filings, we find a positive and significant relationship between Citation weighted filings and New drugs across all six models. Coefficients range from 0.0039 to 0.0091 with marginal effects ranging from 0.05 percent to 0.14 percent. All are significant at the 1 percent level. These marginal effects imply that for a one standard deviation change in Citation weighted filings there is between a 1.06 percent and 2.97 percent increase in the expected number of new product introductions.
In Model 3 through Model 6 we report our findings for Drug loss and its various lags. Similar to the results we report in Table 5 (a), the coefficients peak with Drug loss (t-1) and decline in magnitude to Drug loss (t+1). The variable is not significantly different than zero by year (t+2). These results again suggest to us that firms focus new product introductions in the three-year period surrounding the loss of exclusivity protection of a current drug, with the greatest emphasis at (t-1). Coefficients in this specification are slightly greater in magnitude than those we report in Table 5 The extent to which firms are reaching across international borders to tap into research expertise may also improve research productivity, and lead to commercializable products (Thursby and Thursby, 2006) . To shed light upon the effect that firms'
international research presence has upon new products, we introduce a variable Non-U.S.
inventor constructed as a count variable, equaling the number of patent filings in any firm-year for which the first inventor listed on the U.S. patent is a foreign resident.
Results reported in Tables 5(a) (Model 6) and Table 6 (a) (Models 4 and 6) demonstrate that, whether using probit or negative binomial estimations, the coefficients associated Finally, our control for the underlying research pipeline of our sample firms, Pipeline count, remains positive and significant, and the overall effects remain consistent with those reported in Table 5 (a) and Table 5 (b). Once again, we find no significant effect associated with any of our firm size measures. Griliches (1990) and his progeny have suggested that patents attracting a greater number of forward citations are more valuable, or important, or have a higher quality than are more rarely-cited patents. Because we can directly relate actual sales data to specific patents, we can test this hypothesis. Again, we identify the exact patent(s) linked (by the FDA Orange Book) to FDA-approved products and collect the relevant sales data for these same products. If we find that a firm's non-FDA-Orange-Book-linked patents are more highly-cited than patents linked to products in the Orange Book, the connotation from the existing literature would be that patents unattached to a product are more "important" or "valuable" than the product-attached patents. The implication of such a result would be profound, at least within the context of the pharmaceutical industry, because it would turn practical experience on its head. If the more highly-cited patents are legally challenged (say, in the courts) and protection is subsequently lost, the firm would lose the ability to enforce a patent. However, if a patent associated with a FDAapproved product were challenged and the protection lost, the revenues associated with that underlying patent would be put at substantial risk from competition.
Patent citations and value
We address this issue directly in Table 7 . We compile all pharmaceutical-related patents for our sample firms from 1985 to 2001 and generate three separate citation measures: Total citations I, Total citations II, and Total citations III. We also generate a dummy variable, NDA, which equals 1 if a patent is associated with a FDA approved product. Logit regression estimates for this data regressing NDA on these separate measures of citations are reported in Table 7 (a). Across all three models there is a positive and significant probability that a more highly-cited patent is associated with a FDA-approved product. Therefore, within the pharmaceutical industry, we add support to the notion that more highly cited patents are more "valuable."
We are also interested in determining whether this "value" relationship has changed over time. Table 7 
Timing of new product introductions and patent continuations
"Continuation" application practices permitted in the U.S. patent system allow firms to manage the timing of patent grants. Because patent applicants may trigger a "continuation" application at will, even in the face of a positive grant decision by the patent examiner, the patentee is able to control the ultimate grant-date of the issued patent. 12 Discussions with patent attorneys, and empirical evidence in Graham (2006) , support the notion that pharmaceutical firms use continuation applications to map the grant-date of important patents to the approval of drugs in the FDA-endorsement process.
Consequently, we expect that the use by the firms in our sample of "continuations" in their patenting practice will be positively related to new drug approvals.
We explore this relationship by creating a variable Total continuations which measures the total number of continuing patent application filings associated with firm i's
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We express this finding with an important caveat, however: We have not tested in this paper whether this highly-cited characteristic is endogenous to the inclusion of the patent in the FDA Orange Book--indeed, it may be the case that the simple act of publication makes the future consumers of patent data more likely to become aware of the existence of the patent, and thus makes that patent's citing more likely ex post.
patents issued in year t. 13 Descriptive statistics of this variable show a firm-year mean of 5.8 continuations with a maximum in 1992 of 10.8 continuations and an overall standard deviation of 15.13. Reference to Tables 5(a) (Model 6) and Table 6 (a) demonstrate that, whether using probit or negative binomial estimations, the coefficients associated with Total continuations are positive and significant predictors of New drugs.
Consistent with our treatment of all patent data herein, our continuation measures enter these regressions lagged by five years, and our results remain robust to a three-year lag (unreported). Accordingly, there is predictive power in a firm's choice to use the continuation application process, possibly demonstrating the importance to these firms of employing patent-timing strategies. The marginal effects in Tables 5(b) and 6(b) imply that a one standard deviation increase in Total continuations leads to between a 4.50 percent to 6.05 percent increase in the expected number of new product introductions.
Conclusion
Since Schmookler (1962) and Comanor and Scherer (1969) , researchers have been using patents (and citation-weighted patents) as a proxy for new product development. Within the context of the pharmaceutical industry, we demonstrate that this relationship no longer exists. Our results therefore draw into question the efficacy of using these measures as proxies. We also demonstrate that the relationship between R&D expenditures and new FDA-approved product introductions is considerably smaller than previously reported. We do not call into question the reliability of the results reported in Comanor and Scherer's work based on patents issued in the 1950s, but rather speculate that this change may be the result of a fundamental paradigm shift in pharmaceutical research, or in patenting (Kortum and Lerner, 1998) , or in the use of patent strategies, all of which have been reported but largely ignored in this context.
We make other contributions to the literature. First, we demonstrate that while measures of patenting and citation-weighted patenting remain important in predicting both the introduction, and the number, of new products, by far the most important predictor is the loss of exclusivity on a current product. We consider the apparent ability of pharmaceutical firms to smooth firm revenues by targeting the timing of introductions as impressive given the long development period for drugs. Second, using a large sample of pharmaceutical-related patents for our firms, we are able to demonstrate that more highly cited patents are more likely to be associated with an FDA-approved product.
This finding is economically meaningful since these patents protect the revenue streams of approved products. Third, we find that a correction for patent continuation applications leads to significant differences in the amount of pre-grant application lag, and also that continuation counts act as a significant and positive predictor of new product introduction, suggesting to us that the variable captures some information about firm patenting strategy. Fourth, we find a positive and significant impact of a firm's research pipeline on the probability and expected number of new product introductions.
Finally, we find little relevance to firm effects.
We believe that considerable opportunities exist for further empirical research into these issues. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Unique FDA NCEs 450 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Percentage Patent/R&D R&D/Sales Fig. 3 . The ratio of total firm pharmaceutical patenting to real R&D expenditures is plotted against the ratio of real R&D expenditures to real sales. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Number of patents Applications Issue Fig. 4 . The dotted line accounts for all patent applications filed on behalf of sample firms within defined technology classes (with right side truncation). The solid line accounts for new patents granted to our sample firms within defined technology classes. The mean time lag between an application and its subsequent grant in our sample is 35 months, while the median lag is 32 months. Log R&D Natural log of sum of R&D expenses lagged three to five years
Employees
Number of firm employees
Log total assets Natural log of firm total assets
Log sales Natural log of firm level FDA approved pharmaceutical sales
Log market cap Natural log of firm market capitalization * All financials are in 2000 constant dollars. 
where y is a non-negative count variable defined as the number of new products introduced by a firm in a given year. P(y i,t |ε i,t ) is the probability that pharmaceutical firm i introduces y FDA approved products in year t.
a denotes significance at the 1% level; b denotes significance at the 5% level; and c denotes significance at the 10% level where y is a non-negative count variable defined as the number of new FDA approved products a firm has in a given year. P(y i,t |ε i,t ) is the probability that pharmaceutical firm i introduces y FDA approved products in year t.
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